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THE PLACE OF WRONG: A STUDY IN THE METHOD
OF CASE LAW*

MAX RHEINSTEINt
That problems of the law of torts are to be decided in
accordance with the law of the place where the alleged tort
was committed has long been regarded as axiomatic in the
conflict of laws of the United States as well as of the so-called
civil law countries. Were it not for the divergent attitude
of the British courts, the rule that torts are "governed" by
the lex loci delicti (law of the place of wrong) might be regarded as one of the few rules of conflict of laws which are
uniform throughout the world. Among the reasons which
recommend the rule and which have undoubtedly contributed
to its almost universal acceptance, is the apparent simplicity
of its -application. Where a tort has been committed seems
to be a question of easy determination. It is the place where
the events occurred, as contrasted with the forum, i. e., the
place where the action happens to be brought. However,
cases occur where the determination of the place of wrong is
not quite so easy. The alleged tort-feasor, acting in one jurisdiction, produces a harmful result in another. Is the place
of wrong the place where the actor carried on his conduct, or
is it the place where the harm occurred?2 The Restatement
*The concluding installment of the present article will appear in a
subsequent issue of the Review.
tMax Pam Professor of Comparative Law, University of Chicago Law

School.
'See infra at p. 23; as to divergences to be found in other countries, see Kuhn, Comparative Commentaries on Private International
Law (1937) 310; Ficker, in 4 Rechtsvergleichendes Handwoerterbuch
888 (1933).
2
Even more complicated are the cases in which the conduct was carried on in, or in which the harm extends over, more than one jurisdiction, or in which both conduct and harm extend respectively over more
than one jurisdiction. For instance, D, shooting in state X, hits P in
state Y; or D writes in several states letters containing fraudulent
allegations, which by their combined effect induce P to make in another state a harmful disposition of his property; or D, while speaking over a radio broadcasting station in state X makes defamatory
statements about P which are heard in a whole number of states. In
what jurisdiction has the alleged tort been committed? The follow-
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of the Law of Conflict of Laws, in the first section of its
chapter on "Wrongs," answers the question as follows:
§ 377. The place of wrong is in the state where
the last event necessary to make an actor liable for
an alleged tort takes place.
The Note to Section 377 of the Restatement contains the
following "Summary of Rules in Important Situations Determining Where a Tort is Committed":
1. Except in the case of harm from poison, when
a person sustains bodily harm, the place of wrong is
the place where the harmful force takes effect upon
the body.
2. When a person causes another voluntarily to take
a deleterious substance which takes effect within the
body, the place of wrong is where the deleterious
substance takes effect and not where it is administered.
3. When harm is caused to land or chattels, the
place of wrong is the place where the force takes
effect on the thing.
4. When a person sustains loss by fraud, the place
of wrong is where the loss is sustained, not where
fraudulent representations are made.
5. Where harm is done to the reputation of a person, the place of wrong is where the defamatory
statement is communicated.
These rules and the principle of which they are applications,
are derived from general theories which underlie the entire
structure of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws. In accordance with the thought of its principal author, the late Proing discussion will be limited to cases in which the alleged tort-feasor

acted in only one state and the harmful effect took place only in one
other state. The term "multiple contact tort" will be used to denote
this situation.
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fessor Joseph H. Beale of Harvard,3 the Restatement conceives of the conflict of laws as that branch of the law which
4
is concerned with the enforcement of foreign-created rights.
Once a right has been created by the state or country which
had jurisdiction to do so, it must be enforced by all other
states or countries. 5 The state which has jurisdiction to
create a right in a certain situation is determined in each
case upon the basis of the principle of territoriality: each
state has jurisdiction over persons being within the territory,6
over things situated within the territory, 7 and over acts done
and events occurring within the territory.8 With respect to
"legislative jurisdiction," the latter idea is spelled out more
fully in Section 64, et seq., of which the relevant passages are
as follows:
§ 64. A state can provide for the creation of interests as a result of acts- done in the state or of events
which happen there.
§ 65. If consequences of an act done in one state
occur in another state, each state in which any event
in the series of act and consequences occurs may exercise legislative jurisdiction to create rights or other
interests as a result thereof.
3

Professor Beale was the reporter of the subject. That his influence
was decisive in determining the basic approach and system of the Re-

statement is a matter of common knowledge. His thr~e volume treatise
on The Conflict of Laws, which was published just one year after the
Restatement was promulgated in 1934, and whose arrangement corresponds with that of the Restatement, is commonly accepted as an authentic commentary.
4Cf. 1 Beale, Conflict-of Laws (1935) 64, 65.

5
Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) § 42. As used in the Restatement, the word "jurisdiction" means "the power of a state to create interests which under the principles of the common law will be
recognized as valid in other states." The word "state" in turn is defined as follows in § 2: "As used in the Restatement of this subject,
the word state denotes a territorial unit in which the general body of
the law is separate and distinct from the law of any other territorial
unit."

6Restatement of Conflict Laws (1934)

7Id. §§ 48,49.
8I1d. § 55.

§ 47.

1944]

PLACE OF WRONG

Hence, in the case of a multiple contact tort "legislative
jurisdiction" appertains to the two states concerned, the state
in which the alleged tort-feasor was acting as well as to the
state in which the harmful effects took place. However, another principle, viz. that of vested right, points with necessity toward the latter place.
In order to have a wrong it is necessary to have a
right which is injured by the wrong. Rights heretofore considered 9 have been of the kind known as primary or static rights; that is, they have been created once for all, and remain existent until in some
way put an end to. We are now to consider a class
of rights which are different, in that they are rights
constantly created anew in a continuous series . . .
They are rights protecting the static rights or enabling the owner to enjoy them.
The injury of one of these protective rights by any
person other than the owner is a wrong. If the right
is that of a private person, the wrong is a tort. If it
is in favor of the state, the wrong is a crime...
The place where any tort is committed depends
upon the place where incidental right of protection
is injured ... Incidental rights are created in every
place in which the ownership of the static right is to
be enjoyed. It follows that the place of wrong is the
place where the person or thing harmed is situated
at the time of the wrong. 10
The idea is the same as that which underlies the sections
of the Restatement dealing with contracts, according to which
the law of that place governs where the alleged contractual
right has sprung into existence, i. e., the law of the place
where there occurred "the principal event necessary to make
91. e., property interests, contractual claims, etc.
103 Beale, op. cit. supra note 4, at pp. 1286-1287.
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a contract,""- or, as Beale expresses it, where there was done
"the final act which made the promise or promises binding." 12
Indeed, this solution seems to be required with logical necessity for the fields of both contracts and torts: conflict of laws
is concerned with the enforcement of foreign-created rights.
"The plaintiff owns something, and we help him to get it."'13
The plaintiff cannot own anything until a cause of action
has arisen for him. In a contract situation, no cause of action can conceivably arise before there has been done the
last act to make the contract binding; an action for tort cannot conceivably arise until the plaintiff has suffered a harm.
This cause of action for damages "naturally" arises not only
at the time when the harm is suffered, but also at the place
where it occurs. All that is to be done is to determine at
what time and, consequently, in what place the cause of action arose whose enforcement is sought by the plaintiff. This
task has been undertaken in the note to Section 377 of the
Restatement, which has just been stated.
The rules of that note, it may be well to remember, are
stated as being required by logical necessity. They cannot
be otherwise without offending against elementary laws of
logic, and laws of logic, constituting the rules of coherent
thought, are inexorable. It is therefore with surprise that
we meet Section 382 of the Restatement, whose two sub-sections read as follows:
(1)
A person who is required by law to act or not
to act in one state in a certain manner will not be
held liable for the results of such action or failure
to act which occur in another state.
(2)
A person who acts pursuant to a privilege conferred by the law of the place of acting will not be
.held liable for the results of his act in another state.
iRestatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) § 311, Comment (d).
122 Beale, op. cit. sup-a note 4, at p. 1045.
13 Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E.

198, 201 (1918).
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The application of Sub-section (1) is explained by the following illustrations:
1. It is the duty of a health officer in state X to
destroy infected rags by burning. The place for
burning the rags is fixed by law. By burning the
rags in that place, he causes a nuisance in state Y.
He has a legal defense to any suit against him in Y
based upon the burning of the rags.
2. The facts are the same as in Illustration 1, except that no particular place is provided by law for
the rags to be burned. The officer has a choice of
two places. One of them would obviously cause a
nuisance in state Y and the other would obviously
cause no nuisance; there is no other reason for preferring one place to the other. He burns the rags in
the former place. He is liable for creating a nuisance in Y. (Italics ours.)
3. The master of a vessel registered in state X,
whose vessel is in state Y, is compelled by an official of Y to take on board a person exiled by Y. He
carries that person against his will to the high seas,
and upon passing out of the territorial limits of Y,
the person demands to be set at liberty. The master
is forbidden by the law then controlling his conduct
to turn aside from his course, and by keeping to his
course he can set the exile at liberty only when he
reaches port. The master is justified for the im14
prisonment of the exile during the voyage.
The rule of the second sub-section is illustrated by the following hypothetical cases:
4. By the law of state X, a person who, acting in
a non-negligent manner, harms another in a reasonable attempt to save the life of a third person, is not
14 The facts are those of the English case of Regina v. Lesley, 1 Bell
220, 169 Eng. Rep. 1236 (1860).
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liable to the other; by the law of state Y, he is liable.
A, in state X, seeing B about to murder C, shoots at
B. The bullet fails to hit B, but does hit and wound
C, who is at the time standing in state Y. The act of
A is privileged by the law of X, not by the law of
Y. If A is not negligent in the use of his gun, he
is not liable to C.
5. By the law of X, an attacked party may lawfully
stand his ground and defend himself by killing if
necessary; by the law of Y, he should retire without
killing if it is safe to do so. A, in X, is attacked by
B, who apparently intends to kill A. A reasonably
believes that the only way he can save his life without retiring is to shoot B. He stands his ground,
shoots at B, misses him and hits C in state Y. If he
shoots at B with reasonable care to avoid hitting
third persons, he is not liable to C.
6. By the law of state X, a sheriff is authorized
to shoot a fleeing murderer. X, however, having accepted as part of its law doctrines of international
law, does not authorize its officers to shoot any person in the neighboring state Y. A sheriff of X pursues, in X, B, a fleeing murderer and shoots at him,
but does not stop him. B crosses the line into Y.
The sheriff may not thereafter shoot at him.
In all these illustrations, the decisions absolving the alleged tort-feasor of liability are eminently sound. But how
do they fit in with the general scheme of the Restatement?
If it is logically necessary that a cause of action arising at
the place of harm be enforced everywhere, how can it be
justified that a "privilege" existing at the place of acting,
or a requirement to act or not to act in a certain manner
established by the law of the place of conduct, prevents the
enforcement of the cause of action which has arisen at the
place of harm? No justification for this exception is even
hinted at in the comments to Section 382; nor can any jus-
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tification be found in Beale's Treatise. When we try to apply the exception, we find an antinomy. In explanation of
the cryptic words of Section 382, Sub-section 2, Comment (c)
to that section contains the following statement:
The word "privilege" denotes the fact that conduct
which, under ordinary circumstances, would subject
an actor to liability, under particular circumstances
does not subject him thereto (see Restatement of
Torts, § 10). It is necessary to distinguish between
a situation in which an actor is not liable because of
a privilege, and situations in which he is not liable
because the policy of the law is not to impose liability for harm caused by a certain general type of
conduct. Thus, one who intentionally shoots another
is, unless privileged, liable for the harm caused. If
the actor in such a case is privileged, he is not liable,
but this is because of some particular circumstances
which make the case exceptional. On the other hand,
if a person, while driving his car with due care
strikes a pedestrian and injures him, he is not liable;
but in this situation, the actor is immune from liability not because of some particular circumstances
which make the case an exception to the general rule,
but because the general rule is that liability is imposed in such cases only when the actor has been at
fault. This distinction is important in the Conflict
of Laws because, as stated in § 379, the general
question of the liability-creating character of the
actor's conduct is determined by the law of the place
of wrong, while under the statement of Sub-section
(2) of this Section, the question of privilege is determined by the law of the place where the actor
acts.
In the various legal systems of the world, and especially
in the several variations of the Anglo-American common law,
a certain line of human conduct is declared to be "tortious"
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when it is anti-social, i. e., when it falls below a line of conduct expected of the members of a civilized society. On the
other hand, conduct which is in accordance with the social
standard of the members of the community is non-tortious. If
the concept of privilege is more than a mere technicality, it
means that conduct which per se is anti-social, is tolerated
under certain peculiar circumstances. Hence, if a person engages in conduct which is regarded as being in accord with
the standard of conduct of -the community where he is and
where he acts, but which happens to cause harm in a community where the actor's conduct, had he been there, would
be regarded as anti-social, he is liable under the Restatement.
If, however, he engages in conduct which, although generally
regarded as anti-social at the place where the actor is and
acts, appears excusable because of some peculiar circumstances, and harm is caused at a place where the conduct,
had it been carried on there, would not be regarded as excused, the actor is not liable. In other words, the actor is
not liable for conduct generally regarded at the place of acting as anti-social and dangerous and only excused because of
peculiar circumstances, but he is liable for conduct which is
generally regarded there as innocent and socially blameless!
This strange result follows from the rules of the Restatement when the concept of privilege is regarded as implying a
social evaluation of conduct. More likely, however, the concept of privilege is a merely technical one, a device invented
for the purpose of more conveniently stating a complicated
set of legal rules. A certain line of conduct, for instance,
conduct inducing another to breach a contract, is anti-social
under some circumstances and perfectly correct in others. A
person interested in a systematic presentation of the law,
i. e., a presentation of the law which facilitates the retention of a variety of phenomena by the mind, may express the
situation in either one of the following two ways:
Either he may say that inducing a breach of contract is
a permissible activity, unless there are present certain ag-
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gravating circumstances; or he may say that inducing a,
breach of contract generally constitutes a tort, unless there
are present certail circumstances which amount to a privilege. The former technique is commonly used by German
text-writers, who say that inducing breach of contract is not
a tort unless the actor's conduct was carried on under such
aggravating circumstances as to make it appear as a violation of the standard of boni mores in the technical sense of
Article 826 of the German Civil Code. The second technique
is used by numerous English and American writers, for instance, by the draftsmen of the Restatement of Torts. 6 Shall
the mere accident of different techniques of presentation being used in different states or countries determine liability?
Assume that D, while acting in X, induced T to break his
contract with P; that the breach of contract occurred in Y,
that under the law of Y, inducing breach of contract under
the circumstances of the case amounts to a tort, while under
the law of X the actor is not liable. Under the Restatement,
D is liable if X is Germany, where his conduct does not constitute a tort; he is not liable, however, if X is the United
States, where his conduct, while generally constituting a tort,
is privileged under the circumstances of the case. Such a
distinction is predicated upon accidentalcircumstances, which
have no intrinsic connection with the policies of the case.
The exception established by Section 382 of the Restatement
can only be understood as an inadequate attempt to narrow
down the scope of application of a bad rule.
The operation of another exception to the place-of-harm
rule is illustrated by the case of Schleer v. Rockne Motors
6
Corporation.'
The defendant, an automobile sales corporation, maintained a business office in Buffalo, New York. A
salesman used a car of the corporation for a trip to Ontario.
While there, he had an accident and the plaintiff, a passenger, was injured. Action was brought against the employer
in a federal court in New York. The trial judge framed his
15See Restatement of Torts (1939)

§ 766.

1668 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 2d 1934).
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charge to the jury in accordance with an Ontario statute
which imposed upon car owners a more severe liability than
the law of New York, and he declared it irrelevant whether
or not the defendant had authorized the employee to take the
car into the province. The jury found for the plaintiff. On
appeal, the circuit court held that the trial judge's refusal to
make the distinction was erroneous.
"The judge did not charge the jury," the court stated, "that
they might find for the plaintiff in case Clemens was acting
within the scope of his authority when he went to Canada;
he told them that his mere possession of the car was enough.
It is clear that the defendant did not give him authority to
go to Canada merely by giving him the car. Unless more than
that was shown, the law of Ontario would not reach the defendant; the charge gave it extraterritorial effect, as much
as though that province had pretended to fix liability upon
Clemens for injuries suffered in New York. As this went to
the very heart of the case as it was presented to the jury,
the judgment must be reversed."
These words sound strange within the order of ideas of
the l estatement. The harm of which the plaintiff complains
was suffered in Ontario. Consequently, it was there that
the cause of action arose. Ontario was the place of wrong."
Therefore, the law of Ontario determines whether the plaintiff "has sustained a legal injury,"' 8 and whether "a person
is responsible for harm he has caused irrespective of his intention or the care which he has exercised,"' 19 and it should
be the one to determine whether in case of a harm caused
by an employee the employer is liable. However, the section
dealing with the problem of vicarious liability, Section 387,
contains a qualification for which no justification seems to
exist within the conceptual framework of the Restatement.
This section reads as follows:
1

' Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) § 377, n. 1.

18I& § 378.
19Id. § 379 (c).
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When a person authorizes another to act for him
in any state and the other does so act, whether he
is liable for the tort of the other is determined by the
law of the place of wrong. (Italics ours.)
Comment (a) to this section gives the following explanation:
In order that the law of the state of wrong may
apply to create liability against the absentee defendant, he must in some way have submitted himself to the law of that state. It is sufficient if he
has authorized or permitted another to act for him
in the state in which the other's conduct occurs or
where it takes effect. Thus, if A, in state X, authorizes B to act for him in state Y and B does so
act, A is thereby subjected to the Y law.
Not only was the rule of this proposition of the Restatement judicially applied in Scheer v.Rockne Motors Corporation,20 but it also found expression by Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Young v. Masci.21 Young, a resident of a New Jersey town
in the immediate vicinity of the New York state line, lent
his automobile to Balbino without restriction upon its use.
Balbino took the car to New York, and, while driving there,
negligently struck the plaintiff, who then sued the car owner
in a state court of New Jersey. If all the facts had happened in New Jersey, the defendant would not have been
liable under New Jersey law. The court, however, applied
a statute of New York, under which a car-owner is liable
for an accident negligently caused by anyone driving the car
with the owner's permission. From the state courts the defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court, alleging that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of
the United States was violated by the application to him of
the statute of a state to whose law he had not submitted
20oSupranote 16.

21289 U. S. 253, 53 Sup. Ct. 599, 77 L. Ed. 1158, 88 A. L. R. 170

(1933).
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himself. In denying the appeal, the court emphasized that
"there was evidence to justify a finding that the car was
taken to New York with Young's permission, express or implied. When Young gave permission to drive his car to New
York," the court stated, "he subjected himself to the legal
consequences imposed by that state upon Balbino's negligent
driving as fully as if he had stood in the relation of master
to servant." Since the case was not one of the agent's acting
in New York without the car-owner's permission, the court
had "no occasion to decide where the line is to be drawn generally between conduct which may validly subject an absent
party to the laws of a state and which may not." It is significant, however, that the court did not simply predicate
the defendant's subjection to the New York statute upon the
fact that 'New York was the place of the accident.
This limitation of the place-of-harm rule to situations where
the party sought to be held liable "has in some way submitted
himself to the law of that state," is sound either in all cases
or in none. If we look for a reason for the distinction in
Beale's treatise, we find that Section 387 of the Restatement
is treated with the same silence as Section 382. However,
Young v. Masci is discussed in Section 383.1, which is entitled
"Causation," and in that section Beale disapproves of the decision on the ground that the lending of the automobile was
not the proximate, but only a remote cause of the accident.
"If a person who is a remote cause of an act is to be held
responsible to the law of the state where the event occurred,
a very wide door is opened for one state to impose its law
upon persons acting in other states." What is the reason
for this unexpected regard for the actor? Under the general
place-of-harm rule the actor is disregarded entirely.
The theories of vested right and territoriality have been
criticized frequently and severely. 22 The fallacies of its seem22

See especially Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale L. Jour. 736 (1924 ); Yntema, The Hornbook
Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 Yale L. Jour. 468 (1928); Cavers,
Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1933);
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ingly compelling logic have been pointed out repeatedly,
among others by the late Professor Walter W. Cook, 23 who has
demonstrated the impracticality of the territorial approach.
Jurisdiction over' acts or things cannot be separated from
jurisdiction over persons, because it is always persons who
own or claim things or perform acts. If conflict of laws is
to fulfil any useful function in society, its rules must be derived from principles other than those of a thought system of
fallacious logic. They must be based, like all other rules of
24
law, upon considerations of policy.
Indeed, why at all do we have a branch of law called
conflict of laws? If we would consider this question more
frequently and more thoroughly, a good many of the problems of the conflict of laws might look less formidable and
less forbidding than they appear to us today. Presumably,
the law of conflict of laws fulfills some useful function in
our social order. What is that function?
Assume that John Jones is a druggist in, let us say, Georgia.
He believes in competition and wishes to sell his toothpastes,
shaving creams, soaps, tooth-brushes, et cetera, at a cheaper
rate than the manufacturers want them to be sold to the public. He knows that there are other cut-rate drug stores in
the state, and he has not heard that any one of them has ever
had legal trouble. After several years of successfully conducting his business, he finally decides to retire and to live
Heilman, Judicial Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws,
43 Yale L. Jour. 1082 (1934); Lorenzen and Heilman, The Restatement
of the Conflict of Laws, 83 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 555 (1935).
See also
Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws (1937) 12; Nussbaum, Principles of Private International Law (1943) 26; Willis, Two Approaches
to the Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study of the English Law
and the Restatement of the American Law Institute, 14 Can. Bar Rev. 1
(1936).
23
Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942)
chs. 1, 2, 13. See also Rheinstein, Methods of Legal Thought and the
Conflict of Laws, 10 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 466 (1943).
24
How considerations of policy can and should be used has been
admirably demonstrated in the article by Neuner, Policy Considerations
in the Conflict of Laws, 20 Can. Bar Rev. 479 (1942).
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with his daughter and son-in-law in Chicago. He moves from
Georgia to Illinois, transfers his savings from a Georgia bank
to one in Illinois and settles down to what he expects to be
a peaceful evcening of a busy life. Suddenly, he is hailed
before a court in Cook County, Illinois, by another druggist,
perhaps a former competitor in Georgia, or by a drug manufacturer, and a suit for several thousands of dollars is brought
against him. When he asks upon what basis this claim is
sought to be justified, he is referred to the Illinois Retail
Price Maintenance Act, which declares price-cutting an actionable act of unfair competition. We can safely expect that
the court would decide the case in the defendant's favor.
Otherwise, we should feel shocked. A Georgia resident who
is exclusively engaged in business in Georgia has no reason
to expect that his business practices might ever be subjected
to scrutiny under the standards of the law of-Illinois, or of
any other state or country with which neither he nor his
business has ever had contact. We regard him as justified
in expecting that the legality of his business activities will
be gauged by no law other than that of Georgia, or, perhaps,
of such other states or countries with which his business activities had some obvious contacts. If the mere fact of his
removal to Illinois were suddenly to subject to Illinois liability
activities carried on before his removal to that state, we
would share his "feeling of outrage and would denounce as
unjust, unreasonable and even intolerable a law that would
result in such a decision. His justified expectations would
have been disappointed and we, the public, would not stand
for it.
Or let us assume that John Doe sells a piece of land to
Richard Roe. Both parties to the transaction are native residents of Indiana, where the land is situated. The deal is
negotiated and consummated through an Indiana lawyer, who
has drawn the deed in accordance with Indiana law and practice. Roe, the buyer, has taken possession of the land, but after a short while he discovers that the land is charged with
an outstanding tax lien of which he had no previous knowl-
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edge. When consulting his lawyer he is informed that he
has no remedy against Doe, because Doe had not given in his
deed any express warranty of freedom from incumbrances
and because, under the law of Indiana, no such warranty will
be implied. In the course of the conversation, the lawyer
casually observes that the law is different in Missouri, where
a warranty of freedom from incumbrances is read into a land
deal unless it has been expressly contracted out by the vendor.
It would helpl our purchaser little to hail the vendor before
a court of Missouri, where Doe perhaps owns some property,
or where Doe may some day be traveling. Again, it may be
safely predicted that no court in Missouri would hold the
vendor liable and that, if it did, its decision would be decried
as outrageously wrong. The reason is again that, under the
circumstances, Doe, when he sold his land had no reason to
assume that Missouri law would ever be applied to his transaction.
Finally, let us assume that H has been a lifelong resident of Illinois. In Illinois he went through a ceremony of
marriage in accordance with Illinois law and settled down to
live there with his wife, a native of the state. After several
years of married life, A deserted him, and H obtained a decree of divorce in a court of Illinois, where desertion constitutes a ground for divorce. Some time later, H, still in Illinois, marries B, another native of the state. After three years
of married life with B, he moves with her into South Carolina.
What would we say if a district attorney of that state would
indict H and B for bigamy, alleging that divorce is unknown
to its law and that, therefore, as far as South Carolina is
concerned, H is still married to A? Or how would we feel
if, under such an argumentation, at H's death a South Carolina court would hold that B was not entitled to a widow's
share in H's estate or was not entitled to workman's compensation as his widow? Again, we would feel shocked and appalled and, again, the reason would be the fact that justified
expectations had been rudely disappointed.
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It is for cases like these that the rules of choice of law
have been elaborated. The courts of Illinois are organs of the
social and political community of Illinois. As a general rule,
they are expected to look to Illinois statutes and Illinois precedents. A law other than that of Illinois is of no concern to
them. Yet, in the three cases just stated, we would regard it
as unfair if the court would decide them under the law of its
own state. The cause of this feeling of unfairness, we have
already stated, is the fact that legitimate expe6tations of the
parties would be disregarded, and that there would thus be
violated a policy which is basic for the entire legal order,
and which underlies numerous of the very fundamental institutions of the law, viz. the policy of protecting justified
expectations.
One of the most obvious applications of this policy is constituted by the doctrine of estoppel, which simply means that
a man wvho through his conduct has raised in others the expectation that he will follow a certain line of conduct, is not
allowed to frustrate expenses which those others have incurred in consequence of the expectation raised.
Another expression of the policy that a legitimate expectation ought not to be disappointed, is found in the constitutional
prohibition of ex post facto laws 25 and in the maxim of nulc.
poena sine lege, which has been declared to constitute an indispensable part of the rule of law by the most prominent
26
judicial body of the world.
The same idea that one should not be taken by surprise and
suffer detriment for the non-obedience of a law of which he
could not have any knowledge, is constituted by the rule that
no law is to take effect before it has been properly promul27
gated.
25U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; Art. 1., § 10, cl. 1.
26

Permanent Court of International Justice, Judgments, Orders and

Advisory Opinions, Series A/B, no. 65 (Dec. 4, 1935).
27
For a forceful expression of this principle, see St. Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae, c. 1, q. 90, a. 4: utrum promulgatio sit de ratione
legis, where promulgation is declared to constitute one of the essentials
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It is within the same order of ideas that the principle of
stare decisis is being regarded as fundamental in the common
law. One ought to be able to rely on the stability of judicial
practice. Commercial practices and legal transactions are
being based upon the expectation that courts will not easily
reverse themselves. Countless are the judicial expressions
of the deeply felt necessity to continue a line of precedents,
even though it may appear theoretically unsatisfactory, once
it has become the basis of conveyancers' and business men's
28
practices and property-owners' reliances.
Contract is one of the most basic and most far-reaching
institutions of our whole legal and its underlying social order.
A promise has been made by an individual and has been relied upon by another. The state with its overwhelmingly
powerful machinery of law-enforcement through sheriffs,
deputies, the militia and, as a last resort of latent power, the
army, compels the reneging promisor to live up to his promise
or, at least, to make the promisee whole for the damages he
has suffered through the disappointment of his expectations.
Truly, no more impressive illustration can be imagined of
the fundamental importance of the policy of protecting justified expectations than the deputy sheriff who forcibly breaks
a debtor's resistance. This application of the state's power
machinery becomes understandable, however, when we consider that the entire economic structure of our age is based
upon credit, i. e., upon investors' and other creditors' expectations that their debtors will make proper use of the capital
entrusted to them and that they will honor the creditors' exof law. A neat illustration of the principle, which can be regarded as
truly universal, is furnished in the Napoleonic Code, where France is
divided into zones according to distances from Paris; new laws are not

to go into effect until the expiration of the time needed to reach each
zone under the state of communications in Napoleon's days. The reader
may also remember the wave of indignation when N. R. A. Codes and
similar regulations were sought to be applied without effective publica-

tion.
The creation of the Federal Register was a direct result.
28
For a few illustrations among many, see the cases collected in
Pound and Plucknett, Readings on the History and System of the Common Law (3d ed. 1927) 272 et seq.
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peikations to receive interest and repayment. Only in passing may it be mentioned that the institutions of the trust and
the will are nothing but special applications of the same principle. Such considerations will help us recognize that the
protection of expectations is indeed one of the deepest necessities of all human life itself, social and individual. We could
not live in a world in which we could not foresee that, in
general, our expectations will not be disappointed. The forces
of tradition, social etiquette, morality and religion combine in
stabilizing social life and in thus rendering it predictable; and
all our search for the hidden "laws" of nature is motivated
by the yearning for greater predictability of the ways of
nature, of the weather, for instance, or of the ways of bacteria or of gravitation.
Except where other higher aspirations interfere, expecta{ions must be relied upon, and one of those expectations is
that we ought not to be subjected to punishment, liability
or other legal detriment for conduct which we had good reason
to believe would not subject us to such troubles. It is in this
order of ideas that we find the raisond' 6tre of the condemnation of ex fJost facto laws as well as of that branch of the
legal order with which we are concerned here, viz. choice of
law. This statement should not be misunderstood, however.
It is not suggested here that the policy of protecting justified expectations is the only explanation of the fact that domestic courts occasionally apply a foreign law. There are
others, for instance the policy to assist other friendly states
or nations in the enforcement of social policies, which they
regard as important. Still less is it suggested that the policy
of protecting justified expectations explains those rules of
the conflict of laws which are not choice-of-law rules, i. e.,
rules indicating whether a given case shall be decided under
the domestic or under some foreign law. Rules on jurisdiction of courts, on recognition and enforcement of, foreign
judgments, or on the legal status of aliens are based on pe.
culiar policies of their own. The only proposition made here
is that among the policies motivating a state to refrain in
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certain cases from the application of its own law in favor of
some foreign law, the policy of protecting justified expectations plays a prominent role.
The technique of choice-of-law is not the only one by which
there can be avoided the unfairness of deciding a case under
a law whose application would take the parties by surprise.
A different technique was applied by the English courts until
the late eighteenth century; while they would not decide a
case under any law other than the common law of England,
they did not, as a general rule, assume jurisdiction of a case
unless the facts giving rise to the controversy had occurred in
England. Only when it became apparent that this technique
resulted in frequent denials of justice, the English courts
adopted the technique of choice-of-law; which had been developed for centuries on the continent of Europe, i. e., the
technique of assuming jurisdiction of the "foreign" case but
deciding it under its "proper" law.29 It is significant, however, that the new technique was not applied where it was
not necessary to protect justified expectations. Thus in the
very field of torts, English courts continue to apply English
law, with the important modification, however, that an alleged tort-feasor will not be subjected to liability, when his
conduct, although actionable under English law, is not disapproved by the law of the place where it was carried on.30 This
technique is of easy application, it protects justified expectations, and it appears eminently satisfactory, in spite of criticism.3 1 In the United States, through the mediation of Story
20

0n the historical development see Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the
history of the English law, in 3 Law: A Century of Progress (N. Y.

Univ. 1937) 342.
30

"In order to found a suit in England for a wrong alleged to have
been committed abroad, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the

wrong must be of such a character that it would have been actionable
if committed in England . . . Secondly, the act must not have been
justifiable by the law of the place where it was done." Phillips v. Eyre,
L. R. 6 Q. B. 1, 28-29 (1870).
31
For details of application, see Cheshire, Private International Law
(2d ed. 1938) 296; Dicey, Conflict of Laws (Bentwich's 5th ed. 1932)

770; Foote, Private International Law (Bellott's 5th ed. 1925) 517;
Westlake, Private International Law (Bentwich's 6th ed. 1922).

For
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and his precursors, Livermore and Chancellor Kent, the
choice-of-law technique was taken over from the civilians directly and more completely than in England. It may be questionable whether it was fortunate for the common law of
America that an entire branch of civilian learning was thus
grafted upon it. But with few exceptions 32 the choice-oflaw technique has become an accepted part of American law
and with it the rule that problems of the law of torts are to
be decided in accordance with the law of the place of wrong.
That rule serves its purpose just as well as the English technique does, viz. the purpose of preventing a person from being
subjected to liability under a law whose application he could
not foresee when he engaged in the conduct for which he is
sought to be held responsible.
However, this purpose is easily perverted into its opposite
when the place of wrong is interpreted as the place where
the harm occurred rather than as the place where the alleged tort-feasor was acting. The vague feeling that something is wrong with the place-of-harm rule, that it tends
somehow to prevent the accomplishment of some basic policies, has obviously induced the draftsmen of the Restatement
to concede the exceptions of Sections 382 and 387 and has
motivated the courts which decided such cases as Scheer v.
3 3
or Young-v. Masci.34 But the
Rockne Motors Corporation
lack of awareness of the function to be fulfilled in our social
order by the conflict of laws has prevented the authors as
well as the judges from finding a clearly articulated expression of the way in which the general policy of the conflict
of laws ought to be applied to tort cases of multiple contact.
We have found that the raison d'6tre of the choice-of-law
part of the conflict of laws is our desire not to disappoint
recent criticism, see Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws (1942) 86;
Hancock, Torts in the Conflict of Laws; The First Rule in Phillips v.
Eyre, 3 Univ. Toronto L. Rev. 400 (1940).
32
See infra at p. 31.
33
Supra note 16.
34
Supra note 21.
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legitimate expectations. But whose expectations do we have
to respect in torts cases, and what are they? In order to
answer this question, it is necessary to have a clear conception not only of the policies underlying the choice-of-law
rules, but also of those underlying the law of torts.
The law of torts is the law of loss shifting. An individual
has suffered harm; as a general rule, this is his misfortune.
"Casum sentit dominus," the Romans said, which freely translated means, "The loss lies where it falls." If lightning strikes
my barn, or if a flood or an earthquake destroys my house,
or if I am stricken with disease, it is my loss and I have to
bear it, unless I have been foresighted enough to take out
insurance.3 5 However, there are situations in which I shall
be anxious to shift my loss to another, viz. when my loss was
caused by the conduct of some other human being. Whether
or not, and, if at all, in what cases, I shall be allowed to do
so, is a question determined by the cultural norms, and consequently, by the legal order of the community. As a general
rule, we can say that in our civilization, I am allowed to shift
my loss to its author when that author has caused it through
conduct which falls short of the standard of the community,
i. e., through conduct which is either clearly prohibited or
which falls short of that vague standard to which we expect
"the ordinary prudent man" to conform and the violation of
which we call negligence.3 6
These very general statements could be further refined, but
they suffice for our purpose. Once we have recognized that
the law of torts is the law of loss shifting and that, in general,
our society allows the shifting of a loss to its author only when
that author has failed to live up to the standard of the com35

0r unless the loss falls upon such a multitude of people that the

community comes to the rescue, as in the case of a big flood or a large

conflagration or some other mass calamity.
360r, under certain circumstances, when the author of the harm has
engaged in conduct of which society, because of its social usefulness,

does not disapprove, but which, on the other hand, it regards as so
dangerous to others that it allows it only with the proviso that harm
caused to others must be made good.
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munity, we know that, if we intend to be consistent, the
standard can, at least as a general rule, be furnished only
by that community with the application of whose standard
the actor could reckon when he carried on his conduct; i..e.,
ordinarily, the standard of that community in which he carried on the conduct and, in addition, the standards of those
communities within which the actor could reasonably expect
that his conduct might possibly result in harmful consequences. To apply, however, the standard of a community
with respect to which the actor could not reasonably expect
that his conduct might result in harm, would take him by
surprise and would be contrary to the policy of protecting
legitimate expectations. A person engaging in business or
in other activities must have a fair chance to know by what
standard his conduct will be measured. Then and only then
does he have the possibility of taking those precautionary
measures which will save him from being ruined by becoming liable to others, or of taking out liability insurance. Nobody can avoid violating an unknown standard or can protect himself against the consequences of its violation. But
this is exactly what the place-of-harm rule does: it exposes an
*individual to the risk of rendering himself liable under some
rule of law. against whose application no reasonable diligence
can protect him.
A radio speaker can reasonably be expected to adapt his
criticisms of other individuals to the defamation laws of those
states or countries where his speech can ordinarily be heard.
It would be outrageous, however, to apply the defamation law
of, let us say, Great Britain, to an Illinois politician when
the Chicago long-wave station happened to be heard in Great
Britain in consequence of unusual meteorological conditions.
It would be equally unjust to apply to the publisher of a
small-town Texas newspaper the libel laws of England solely
because a stray copy of his paper has reached that country.
So far, we have been concerned exclusively with the alleged tort-feasor and his expectations. We have not taken
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into regard at all the person who has suffered harm, the
tort victim. Are not his expectations equally worthy of protection? They certainly are, but what expectations does he
have? He probably hopes not to be harmed by others, and if
he should be harmed, nevertheless, to obtain some compensation. But the hope to be- thus compensated is not an expectation actually influencing the course of human conduct.
In order not to render myself liable to others I may, and
frequently will, take precautions. I shall try to familiarize
myself with the standard of the community and to live up
to it and, frequently, I may protect myself against my own
possible shortcomings by taking out liability insurance.
Expectations as to the state of legal protection may also
influence significantly the conduct of a property owner or
simply of an individual as such. Whether I find it necessary
to build my house as a castle or whether I can leave the door
open at night, nay, even whether I choose to live in a country
at all or to invest my money there, may well depend upon
the state of its criminal law, on the efficiency of its police,
the stability of its currency, or on its other laws concerning
the creditor-debtor relation. But the expectation that, when
I suffer a loss, its author will make it good, does not influence my conduct. I avoid being run over by a car even when
I know that the negligent driver will be held liable, because, if for no other reason, there is a possibility that
the author of my harm, although legally liable, may be
financially irresponsible. Just as little will the possibility
of an eventual recovery of damages from an eventually solvent
tort-feasor prevent me-from taking out fire, theft or accident
insurance. So far we- have used the term "legitimate" or
"justified" expectations without defining the qualifier. An
expectation is ordinarily justified when it constitutes the motive of conduct which is socially useful or, at least, not socially disapproved. An expectation which does not motivate
conduct is not worthy of legal protection, and the one whose
conduct is, at least potentially, motivated by the structure
of the legal norms of a given society is the one who engages
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in conduct rather than the one to whom harm may be caused
through such conduct. It is for this reason that in the determination of the expectations regarded as justified and thus
to be protected by the rules of choice-of-law, we may all but
disregard the tort victim and concentrate on the author of
37
the harm.
Yet, there is an indirect way in which the interest of the
victim may play a certain role, viz., as it is reflected in an
interest of an entirely different kind, not an individual interest at all, but the collective interest of the community in which
the harm occurs. If that community, in pursuance of some
policy of its own, wishes to make whole the person who has
suffered the harm at the expense of its author, it may well
do so, provided always, however, that the application of its
law does not take the actor 'by surprise. Where the actor
could not foresee that his conduct would cause harm in the
state where it did occur, the application of the law of that
latter state is always inappropriate. But, where it could reasonably be foreseen that harm might result in the state where
it occurred, there is nothing inappropriate in that state's applying its own law. On the other hand, nothing requires the
state where the conduct was carried on, or a third state, where
the case may come up for decision, to apply the law of the
state where the harm occurred. While normally each court
applies its own law, it decides an occasional case under some
foreign law in order to avoid the disappointment of some
justified expectation. But no such policy requires a court
to decide such a case under the law of some other foreign
state which, in applying its own law to conduct carried on
abroad, does so solely for the purpose of protecting interests
:regarded as located within its territory.
There remains but one objection to be answered, viz. the
objection that the approach advocated here does not neces37

Hancock comes near to this idea when he says: "Does not history
suggest that the recognition of foreign defences is more pressing and

important than the recognition of foreign claims?"
supra note 31, at p. 57.

Hancock, op. cit.
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sarily result in uniformity of decision. While the law of the
state where the conduct was carried on is applied by that
state itself as well as by third states, the possibility is left
open that another law, viz. its own, be applied by the state
where the harm occurred.
Uniformity of decision has often been represented as the
raison d'6tre of choice-of-law rules3 8 It has been stated as
the ideal of the conflict of laws that a case should be decided
in the same way wherever it might happen to come up for
decision. However, we ought to go a step further and ask
ourselves why uniformity of decision is so desirable. To
some minds, to be sure, uniformity appears as a value in itself. With anyone holding that faith, no further argument
is possible. To us it seems that uniformity of decision is a
means toward the end of protecting justified expectations.
However, uniformity of decision does not serve this end unless the law to be applied uniformly is so chosen as to correspond to the parties' justified expectations. If it is not so
chosen, uniformity of decision may well result in defeating
its purpose.
The rule of lex loci delicti, when uniformly applied, fulfils
the purpose as long as the place of wrong is the place of acting, and even where it is the place of harm and harm at that
place could reasonably have been foreseen by the actor. However, where place of wrong is interpreted as place of harm
and harm at that place was not reasonably foreseeable, the
rule fails to fulfil its purpose, an antagonism arises between
the ideal of uniformity and that of protection of justified
expectations, and unless we worship uniformity for its own
sake, the former ideal has to yield. 39
3

sSee, among others, Goodrich, Handbook of the Conflict of Laws

(2d ed. 1938) 5-6; Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested
Rights, 27 Yale L. Jour. 656 (1918); Goodrich, Public Policy in the
Law of Conflicts, 36 W. Va. L. Quar. 156, 164 (1930).
3gThe possibility of such a conflict has not been recognized by Hancock, op. cit. supra note 31, § 11, who regards uniformity of decision
as the ideal end of the conflict of laws and then justifies the place-of-

wrong rule as the one which best protects the parties' justified ex-
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Once we have recognized that uniformity of decision is not
an end in itself but a means toward an end, we are also pre.pared, to give up uniformity where it is unnecessary for the
achievement of that end.
But there still remains an objection. In proposing an ap-"
proach under which different states may apply different laws,
do we not give the plaintiff a chance to shop around for the
forum most favorable to him? We do, but our answer is
"why not?" If the state where the harm occurred-can get
hold of the actor or his property and can thus enforce its
law, why should it refrain from doing so in cases where the
application of that law .is no surprise? But why shall other
states with less rigid standards of their own apply the more
rigid law, simply because the state of the place of harm cannot get hold of the tort-feasor? There is no reason unless
we worship uniformity for uniformity's sake.
Thus, we can finally formulate those rules which appear as
a more adequate expression of the policies underlying choiceof-law in tort cases than those arbitrarily derived from seemingly logical but impracticable doctrines of territbriality and
vested right.
These rules are as follows:
(1)
Problems of the law of torts are determined by the
law of the place where the person sought to be held responsible was engaged in the conduct for whichhe is sought to
be held responsible.40
pectations.
He states in § 12: "The reasonable expectations of the
parties are not the least of the various factors to be considered in choosing a proper law. It would be inequitable to determine their rights
and duties upon a principle whose application to their affairs they
had no reason to anticipate. From this point of view the law of the
place of wrong would seem to be a satisfactory choice. Most persons
realize when they enter a jurisdiction that they are bound to comply

with the laws in force there." We agree; but this argumentation reveals the inappropriateness of the place-of-wrong rule qua place-ofharm rule when harm at that place was not reasonably foreseeable.
40
The formulation of this rule is intended to indicate that in cases
of so-called vicarious liability the law of that place is to be consulted
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'31

(2) If harm was caused -in one state through-ocnduct
which was carnied on in another state, the state where the
harm occuired may apply its own law unless
(a)

the person sought to be held liable could not reasonably foresee at the time the conduct was oarried
on that it would cause harm in the state where such
harm actually occurred; or

(b)

the actor was obliged to carry on his conductfn
the way he did by some rule of law of the. place
where he carried on his conduct.

These rules, it is believed, express adequately those policies
which have inspired the decisions of the American cofirts,
with the exception of those cases which have been motivated
either by the territoriality-vested rights doctrine, so thoroughly discredited today, or by precedents rendered up6n issues which have only an apparent analogy to the problems
of choice-of-law. These cases are, as we shall see, cases in
admiralty, criminal cases and cases dealing with trespass to
land.
where the person sought to be held liable was carrying on the line of

conduct on the basis of which he is sought to be held responsible for a
harm immediately caused by another person or a thing. If D carries
on a business in X and his employee causes harm in Y, the law of X
is primarily to be consulted. The same rule applies if a father is sought

to be held liable for the act of his son, or a husband for the act of
his wife, or a dog owner for harm caused by his dog; all this, subject,

however, to rule no. 2 of the text.

